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According to rational choice theory, people will choose their careers, level of work 
effort or investment based in part on their expectations of success.  But are people’s 
expectations of their likelihood of success accurate?   Evidence accumulated by 
psychologists suggest that on average people underestimate their risks and 
overestimate their abilities relative to others.  We test for such optimistic bias in 
experiments where people must predict their relative or absolute success in incentive-
based verbal and maximization contests.  We ask subjects to provide initial and 
revised point estimates of their success rates, either hypothetically or with a scoring 
rule that rewards forecast accuracy.  We then passively measure the quantity and 
quality of subjects’ efforts and subsequent outcomes.  Bias in forecasts is evaluated at 
the aggregate level as done by psychologists, but also at the individual level using 
realized outcomes.  We find limited evidence of excess optimism only in relative 
maximization contests when encountered first, and excess pessimism or accuracy 
elsewhere.  Experience across contests and updating does not always increase the 
accuracy of self-assessed forecasts, and even when accuracy improves biases are 
rarely eliminated entirely.  Methodologically, we find no evidence that a modest 
quadratic scoring rule introduces moral hazard for own-outcome forecasts, but neither 
does it increase forecast accuracy or lower variance. 
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1.  Introduction and Background 
 
 Are people good judges of their own abilities?  Are they unbiased on average, 
as rational choice theory assumes, or do they spin webs of optimistic self-delusion, as 
psychologists suspect?  The answer to this question has profound implications, 
because people may rely on self-assessments when choosing career paths, investment 
in higher education or in the stock market, starting businesses, committing to 
marriage, and so on.  Systematic over-confidence could lead people to spend too 
much effort trying to break into highly competitive or difficult schools or jobs or 
markets (Frank and Cook, 1995).  It could suggest a role for outside intervention to 
“de-bias” people’s expectations, or else tax or limit their choices.  In contrast, a lack 
of systematic bias would suggest that the decisions people make are individually 
optimal, given available ex ante information. 
 Attempts to measure the accuracy of people’s expectations of their own 
abilities have been thwarted by several factors.  Conceptually, researchers need a true 
or rational benchmark against which expectations can be compared.  Fischoff et al. 
(2000) compare teenagers’ current probability point estimates of various life events 
against current aggregate realizations.  As the authors recognize, this comparison is 
imperfect in that future realizations may differ from current ones, and because 
individuals may correctly perceive factors that increase or decrease their personal 
likelihoods relative to published reference population frequencies.  Individual future 
realized outcomes would seem an ideal benchmark, except that a) few longitud inal 
studies yet exist that precisely compare quantitative forecasts and subsequent 
outcomes, and b) individuals may alter their subsequent behaviour in ways that alter 
the actual likelihood of particular outcomes. 
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 Within experimental psychology Weinstein (1980) pioneered a literature that 
cleverly side-stepped the need for benchmarks by testing for relative forecast bias in 
the aggregate.  He asked individuals to rate their chance of experiencing a pleasant or 
unpleasant event relative to their peers, or others of a similar occupation or age or 
situation.  Weinstein elicited ordinal forecasts on a seven point scale centred at zero, 
with -3 for “much below average (risk)” and +3 for “much above average (risk)”.  
Problems about averages vs. medians aside1,  this literature has yielded a robust 
anomaly that most people report they anticipate an above-average risk of high starting 
salaries and job satisfaction, staying married, having gifted children, and so on 
(Weinstein (1980), Baker and Emery (1993)).  Conversely, most people report they 
have a below average risk of car accidents (Svenson 1981), job loss or unemployment 
(Weinstein (1980), or health problems (Weinstein 1982, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1995, 
1998, Miller et al. (1990)). 
 This “optimistic group bias” has been found to be most prevalent for events 
over which respondents perceive some measure of control, or lack personal 
experience, or judge to be infrequent (Weinstein (1984), (1987)).  It has been studied 
primarily among student subjects, but also across the general population (Weinstein 
(1987)), and appears resistant to verbal warnings and “de-biasing” manipulations 
(Weinstein (1995)).  Over-optimism has been attributed to the “representativeness 
heuristic”, or tendency of individuals to judge the likelihood of an event by the degree 
to which it resembles a stereotype, regardless of base rate frequency (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982)).  It seems conspicuously absent only among the clinically 
depressed (Alloy and Ahrens (1987), Pyszczynski et al. (1987)).     
                                                 
1   It is thoroughly rational for most people to rate themselves below average in a distribution that is 
negatively skewed, and above average in a distribution that is positively skewed.  
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While economists are beginning to incorporate psychological findings into 
economic analysis (Rabin 1998), optimism bias has received surprisingly little 
investigation.  Existing studies either focus on the consequences of overconfidence 
assuming it exists, or test for it using only non- incentive survey instruments.2  For 
instance, in an experiment on market entry, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) suggested 
that overconfidence about one’s relative ability might explain excess entry and lower 
profits, and extrapolated that it might also explain the high rate of new business 
failures.  Barber and Odean (2001) compare the common stock investments of men 
and women, and find that men trade more excessively than women and as a 
consequence obtained lower profits on average.  The authors attribute the difference 
to men being more overconfident than women about the relative precision of their 
knowledge.3 
In survey investigations, Dominitz (1998) uses three consecutive rounds of the 
United States Survey of Economic Expectations to elicit entire probability 
distributions of future earnings and compare these with realized outcomes.  Subject to 
sample attrition problems, Dominitz find that overall Americans are too optimistic 
about changes in future income.  At the same time, expectations are revised more 
sharply in response to income drops than income rises.  Das and van Soest (1997), 
(1999) follow up data on expected and realized income changes over six consecutive 
years of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel.  These authors also contend with sample 
attrition problems, and unlike Dominitz were limited to ordered categorical data.  In 
contrast to Dominitz, Das and van Soest find that heads of households generally 
                                                 
2 Overconfidence is also beginning to find its way into theoretical models.  For example, Benabou and 
Tirole (2002) develop a model where overconfidence about one’s own ability can be self-serving for 
individuals with imperfect willpower.  The potentially “self-serving” nature of optimism biases has 
long been recognised in the psychology literature (Taylor and Brown (1988)). 
3 Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) provide a review of this calibration literature. 
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underestimated future income changes.  This was particularly true for those who had 
experienced a fall in income, and the effect was robust over all 6 years of the panel.  
One limitation of surveys, whether by economists or psychologists, is that 
people are not provided with incentives to think carefully about their predictions 
(other than the general incentive to be cooperative and appear intelligent to the 
interviewer).  Another limitation is that annual longitudinal surveys do not provide 
people with timely feedback on the accuracy of their predictions, or the opportunity to 
revise their predictions about a fixed event as new information becomes available.   
We take a different approach in this paper, using experiments to directly 
measure people’s expectations of their own performance, either in absolute contests or 
relative tournaments.  By using experiments, we hope to provide participants with 
incentives for accurate prediction, and with opportunities for feedback and revision.  
We will also be able to test for optimism bias using individual realized outcomes as 
the benchmark for evaluation, as well as group averages.4 
To provide subjects with incentives for careful prediction, we use a quadratic 
scoring rule to reward them for greater forecast accuracy over their performance in  
contests or tournaments (see Huck and Weizsacker (2002)).  Technically, quadratic 
scoring rules are only incentive compatible for agents making predictions concerning 
events over which they have no control (or moral hazard), and who are risk neutral.  
Nonetheless, with suitable attention paid to the relative rewards for performance and 
prediction, moral hazard can be eliminated in theory.  Further, by passively measuring 
the quantity and quality of effort with and without a scoring rule, moral hazard can be 
tested for in practice.  Risk neutrality can also be induced in theory, by using payoffs 
in lottery points for both prediction and performance (Berg et al. (1986)).   
                                                 
4 The data set also allows us to check whether biases are self-serving, by comparing individual biases 
with performance. 
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 To provide subjects with feedback, we have them enter two sets of two 
different competitions, revising their forecasts for the second set after playing the 
first. In more structured game theoretic settings, Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) find 
that excess optimism about market prices (and therefore earnings) can be reduced 
substantially by such feedback.   
 Finally, in the event that people are biased in their expectations of success in 
competitive settings, it is useful to know if this is due to errors in forecasting their 
own (absolute) ability, or their ability relative to others.  We thus compare the 
accuracy of people’s predictions in contests with absolute or relative performance 
criteria. 
 We find that optimistic group bias is not as robust as the psychology literature 
would suggest.  We also find that modest scoring rules can be used without 
introducing moral hazard, but that they do not reduce mean forecast errors over non-
incentive forecasts.  Finally, we find intriguing evidence that people have less 
difficulty predicting their success relative to others than against an absolute 
performance threshold.    
 The remainder of the paper will run as follows.  In Section 2 we outline our 
experimental design.  In Section 3 we present our results, and in Section 4 we discuss 
our findings and conclude. 
  
2.  Experimental Design: Mountain Climbing and Espionage 
   We wanted a design in which subjects had to predict their own performance 
in a task requiring real yet quantifiable effort.  We also wished to examine predictions 
over tasks that required diverse skills and opportunities for learning.  We settled on 
two tasks.  The first was maximizing the unknown function:  
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where x and y are coordinates on a spreadsheet, and a, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters. 
Subjects attempt to maximize (1) by moving contiguously from cell to cell on a 
spreadsheet.  This task is a simplified version of the two-variable optimization task 
used by van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Winden (2001) to examine the effect of different 
incentive schemes on work effort.  In each round the unknown function took on the 
same smooth, paraboloid, shape, and obtained a maximum value of 100,400.  The 
most direct route to the peak required 200 moves, with 240 moves possible per round.  
The location of the function’s maximum was shifted randomly around the 
circumference of a circle centred at the spreadsheet’s origin.  Thus the degree of 
difficulty remained the same in each round. 
The second task was decoding five letter words, drawn from a random sample 
of 1155 such words taken from the 1993 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.5  The  
coding scheme was comprised of a unique letter-for-letter mapping, and was held 
constant for all words within a round, but randomly reset between rounds.   
These maximization and verbal decoding tasks were fully computerized, and 
took place in 60 second rounds, with ten rounds per set.  Each participant tried two 
sets of one task, then two sets of the other.  In half of sessions the maximization task 
came first, and in half the verbal decoding task came first. 
 In any given session, 12 subjects would read computerized instructions for the 
first task, try two practice rounds, then try a first and second sets of 10 rounds.  After 
the practice rounds but before the first set, subjects were asked how many of the first 
and second 10 rounds they thought they would win.  After completing the first 10 
rounds, subjects were reminded of their initial forecast for the second 10 rounds, and 
                                                 
5   Proper names and obscure words were avoided. 
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asked to re-enter a prediction, whether revised or not.  Upon completing the second 10 
rounds, subjects were presented with instructions for the second task, and then 
proceeded through an analogous order of practice rounds, prediction for both sets, 
first set, revised prediction, and second set.  Subjects were given immediate feedback 
on whether they had won or lost each round, and were informed of their earnings 
accumulation from prediction and performance after each set.   
2.1  Criteria For Winning   
 Of 16 sessions that rewarded forecast accuracy, half (3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 and 
14) required subjects to meet an absolute standard to win each round.  For 
maximization, the standard was to reach a value of 100,000 on the unknown function 
within 60 seconds, with a constraint of 4 contiguous cells’ movement per second. A 
cell’s value appeared only when the cursor was on it.  For verbal decoding, the 
standard was decoding 2 five letter words within 60 seconds, with a constraint of 4 
letter guesses per second.  Subjects were free to continue maximising or decoding 
letters for the full 60 seconds, even after meeting the standard, though we do not use 
any “post-win” data that this generates. 
 The other eight sessions (1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16) required subjects to meet a 
relative standard to win each round.  For maximization, the 5 of 12 participants who 
had reached the highest function value by the end of a round won, while for decoding, 
the 5 of 12 participants who had decoded the greatest number of letters by the end of 
the round won. 6  Ties were automatically broken at random, so that there were always 
exactly 5 winners, and an aggregate probability of winning each round of .4167 (= 
5/12). 
 
                                                 
6   The tournament design literature suggests that effort is promoted best and collusive laziness avoided 
with larger group sizes (8 rather than 4 or 2), and intermediate rather than extreme win rates (Orrison et 
al. (1998) , Harbring and Irlenbusch (2001)). 
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2.2  Eliciting Predictions  
Exactly how beliefs should be elicited has raised disagreements within and 
between disciplines.  At one extreme, psychologists such as Weinstein (1998) argue 
that the public has difficulty generating risk estimates in terms of percentages, so that 
ordinal measures (“very likely”, “somewhat likely” etc.) should be used.  At the other 
extreme, economists such as Dominitz and Manski (1997) argue that with suitable 
preparation, individuals can meaningfully provide entire probability distributions to 
forecast variables such as income.  More commonly, an intermediate approach of 
eliciting point estimates of probability as numbers between 1 and 100, or simply 1 and 
10 is used ((Weiner (1976), Viscusi (1990), Fischoff et al. (2000), Morrison and 
Rutstrom (2000), Jamison and Karlan (2003)).  We adopt this intermediate approach 
and ask subjects to report the number of rounds (out of 10) that they expect to win. 7   
In 16 sessions subjects were rewarded for the ex post accuracy of their ex ante 
set predictions according to the quadratic scoring rule: 
  
2( )
5
20
P W-
-       (2) 
P and W refer to the predicted and realized number of rounds won, respectively. 8  The 
predicted number of rounds won for the first set of a task was compared to the first set 
outcome, while the revised prediction for the second set was compared to the second 
set outcome.    
This rule gives risk neutral subjects (without moral hazard) proper incentives 
for reporting their true expected value for the number of rounds they would win.  Note 
                                                 
7 This estimate can be converted into a point estimate of the probability of winning each round by 
dividing by ten. 
8 The scoring rule takes the same form as that used by Huck and Weizsacker (2002) to elicit beliefs 
about the choices of other players.  Quadratic scoring rules have also been used to elicit probabilities in 
the context of Bayesian inference (e.g. McKelvey and Page (1990), Grether (1992)) as well as beliefs 
about other players (e.g. Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1998), Morrison and Rutstrom (2000), 
Nyarko and Schotter (2000)). 
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from (2) that earnings from forecast accuracy would be maximized if the number of 
rounds won turned out to match the initial prediction perfectly.  Forecast earnings 
would be minimized at 0 per set if the forecast error was at the maximum possible 
level of 10 rounds.  Unfortunately, the rule also suffers from weak payoff dominance, 
in that small forecast errors of one or two rounds cost little (Davis and Holt (1993)).  
In addition, because subjects have partial control over the outcomes, they could face 
moral hazard incentives, such as deliberately making low forecasts of success and 
then “throwing” rounds in order to receive payment for accurate forecasts.  We 
address this below.  To induce risk neutrality in theory, (though less clearly in practice 
(Selten, Sadrieh and Abbink (1999))), we reward subjects for accurate prediction and 
performance using points that they accumulate for use in a single draw at the end of 
the session (as in Berg et al. (1986)).  Each subject enters a final private draw between 
an $8 prize and a $30 prize, with the probability of winning $30 given by the number 
of points accumulated from performance and accurate prediction over the session. 
2.3  Addressing Moral Hazard in Design 
 Since people’s performance in a contest is constrained positively by their 
ability, we focus on the problem of people underperforming in order to make their ex 
post outcome align with low ex ante forecasts.  This could occur under two 
conditions.  First, a subject could make an honest but overly pessimistic prediction of 
winning x of 10 rounds, and then throw any rounds after winning that number.  
Second, a subject could purposefully make a low prediction, then purposefully under-
perform to meet it. 
 To foreclose both incentives, we set the marginal reward from winning an 
additional round, 2 points, to exceed any possible marginal cost from increasing 
forecast error by an additional round (see Table 1).  These marginal costs range from  
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Table 1:  Points Payoffs from Performance and Prediction Per Set 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Payoff From Performance Penalty From Forecast Error 
# Rounds     Total      Marginal         Total      Marginal 
  
      0        0  --       .00  -- 
      1        2  2       .05  .05 
      2        4  2       .20  .15  
      3        6  2       .45  .25 
      4        8  2       .80  .35 
      5      10  2     1.25  .45 
      6      12  2     1.80  .55 
      7      14  2     2.45  .65 
      8      16  2     3.20  .75 
      9      18  2     4.05  .85 
    10         20  2     5.00  .95 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
.05 points to .95 points.  Thus in all cases subject will do well to make accurate 
predictions, but better if they actually win as many rounds as possible.  Over all four 
sets of a session, subjects could accumulate a maximum of 20 points from accurate 
prediction, and 80 points from winning every round. 
 Theoretical incentives aside, we also check whether rewarding forecast 
accuracy creates moral hazard in practice by running additional relative tournament 
sessions (17 to 20) with non-incentive forecasts.9  These sessions were replications of 
tournament sessions 1, 2, 5 and 6, except that subjects were asked simply to try their 
best to predict how many rounds they would win, and accumulated points based only 
on performance.  Since participants in these sessions could accumulate fewer points 
toward the final draw, an un-announced participation fee of $4 was added to their 
final earnings.  
                                                 
9  We believed the incentive to “throw rounds” would be strongest in the context of relative 
tournaments, where after the first set had been completed subjects would have a good idea of their 
ability relative to other participants. 
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3.  Experimental Results 
 239 student subjects participated over 20 sessions of the experiment between 
March and May of 2003 at the University of Canterbury. 10  Students were recruited 
from large first and second year courses in economics, statistics, and mathematics.11  
Each session took approximately one hour and thirty minutes, and earnings ranged 
from NZ$10 to $42, with an average of $23.97.12 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics of our results.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
contest or tournament outcomes sometimes differed depending on the order in which 
they were experienced.  In relative tournaments, Mann-Whitney tests detected 
significant order effects for predictions and forecast error in the maximization task, 
though none were found in the decoding task.  In absolute contests, order effects were 
found for revised forecast errors in the maximization task, and in some measures of 
effort quality and quantity in both tasks.  Order effects could derive positively from 
skills or experience gained in the first task spilling over to the second, or negatively 
from fatigue.  While no order effects were detected for relative verbal tournaments, 
we report them in disaggregated form in keeping with the other cases where 
separation is warranted.  
3.1  Ex Post Tests for Moral Hazard and Scoring Rule Effects 
 Consistent with the incentives in our design, we find no evidence that using a 
modest quadratic scoring rule to reward subjects for forecast accuracy in relative 
tournaments created moral hazard.  When maximization came first, we compared all 
measures of prediction, effort quality and quantity, and outcomes for Sessions 1, 2, 9
                                                 
10   One of the 239 subjects somehow circumvented the programmed constraint that spreadsheet search 
in the maximization contest be between contiguous cells.  Fortunately, this was in an absolute contest 
session, and had no spillover effects to other participants.  The results for this subject are dropped from 
analysis.   
11   Demographic characteristics were collected from students following each session, but have not yet 
been analyzed.  The data presented here was part of a larger experiment collecting additional data. 
12   The 2003 adult hourly minimum wage in New Zealand was $8.50. 
 12 
Table 2:  Summary of Mean Results 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
       ABSOLUTE CONTESTS RELATIVE TOURNAMENTS 
  
       Maximisation Verbal  Maximisation Verbal 
       First      First  First  First 
    N = 48  N = 46  N = 72  N=72  
    _____________________           _________________________ 
 
MAXIMISATION 
 
Predicted Wins/10 Set I  3.77  3.67  4.76**  3.61** 
Predicted Wins/10 Set II 4.63  4.76  4.89*** 3.75 
 
Actual Wins Set I  3.19  2.74  4.17  4.17 
 
Revised Pred. Wins Set II  4.33  3.80  4.71**  3.97 
 
Actual Wins Set II  3.96  4.59  4.17  4.17 
 
Individual Bias (Pred. – Wins) 
 Set I    0.58  0.93**  0.60*   -0.56*  
 Initial Set II  0.67  0.17  0.72**  -0.42 
 Revised Set II  0.38  -0.78**  0.54*  -0.19 
 
 
VERBAL DECODING 
 
Predicted Wins/10  Set I 2.44  2.57  3.75  3.61** 
Predicted Wins/10 Set II 2.94  3.46  3.96  3.96 
 
Actual Wins Set I  3.42  3.07  4.15a  4.17 
 
Revised Pred. Wins Set II  3.58  3.67  4.21  3.97 
 
Actual Wins Set II  5.27  4.83  4.15a  4.15a 
 
Individual Bias (Pred. – Wins)   
 Set I   -0.98**  -0.50  -0.40  -0.56 
 Initial Set II  -2.33*** -1.37**  -0.19  -0.19 
 Revised Set II  -1.69**  -1.15*** -0.01  -0.18 
_____________________________________________________________________    
* , **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, in two tailed t-
tests.  In the case of Predicted Wins, denotes significant difference from average win rate.  In 
the case of the Individual Bias measures, indicates significant difference from zero bias. 
 
a  A minor feedback errors resulted in one subject in one set in  each of sessions 2, 10 and 20 
being told and rewarded as if he or she had won one fewer rounds than was the case.  This 
lowered the aggregate wins averaged per round to 4.08 (= 49wins/120 rounds) for the flawed 
set, and 4.15 when combined with the five error-free sets. 
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and 10 (with the scoring rule) against Sessions 17 and 18 (without).  For variables 
measured round by round, such as effort level and quality, we average an individuals’ 
observations over the ten rounds of a set as our unit of observation. 13  Mann-Whitney 
tests discerned no significant differences in any variables, with one borderline 
exception.  In particular, the distribution of initial predictions for Set I of the 
maximization tournament was marginally lower with the scoring rule than without 
(Mann Whitney r = .104, NI = 48, NII = 24).  While this difference is consistent with 
moral hazard effects, no such differences were detected for initial or revised Set II 
predictions under maximization, nor under any variables for the subsequent verbal 
decoding tournament.  More importantly, there was no evidence of differences in 
effort quality or quantity when the scoring rule was used for any set or task.  
Difference in effort would be a necessary condition for evidence of moral hazard in 
the form of “thrown” rounds.  
 When the verbal decoding task came first, we compared measures of 
prediction, effort and outcomes for Sessions 5, 6, 15 and 16 (with the scoring rule) 
against Sessions 19 and 20 (without).  Mann Whitney tests detected no significant 
difference in any measure for either type of tournament (again, NI = 48, NII = 24).  
 While it is a relief to know that rewarding subjects for forecast accuracy did 
not appear to influence their subsequent performance via moral hazard, it would be 
more interesting yet to know if it made them better forecasters.  Our results here 
suggest that our modest scoring rule did not reduce either forecast bias or variance.  In 
particular, we define forecast bias, BIASi as the difference between the number of 
rounds subject i said she was going to win, and the number she did win.  Our design 
                                                 
13   In the verbal decoding contests we collected data on keys pressed, letters pressed, and frequency of 
repetitive incorrect guesses.  In the maximization contests we collected data on the value reached, 
number of moves, perseverance in incorrect directions, and amount of backtracking through previously 
explored cells.  
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yields six BIAS observations per subject: one for the first set of a task, an initial and 
revised one for the second set of the task, and three analogous measures for the other 
task.  To our surprise, none of the BIAS measures were discernibly different when the 
scoring rule was used.  Similarly, Levene’s Test for the Equality of Variance detected 
no difference in the variance of any of the BIAS measures with the scoring rule than 
without.14 
 In short, we find that using a quadratic scoring rule with low payoffs relative 
to those from performance had no discernible effect on moral hazard or forecast 
accuracy over non- incentive forecasts.  We shall thus pool results for corresponding 
sessions that did and did not reward forecast accuracy.      
3.3  Where Have All the Optimists Gone? 
 We move now to our principal investigation of forecast accuracy.  Our design 
enables us to test for rational expectations using the group bias approach of 
Weinstein, or an individual bias approach using realized outcomes.  Group bias is 
testable in the relative tournaments (Sessions 1,2,5,6,9,10,15,16,17,18,19,20) by 
asking whether mean predictions for each set differ significantly from the aggregate 
win rate of .417.15  The last two columns of Table 2 provide the results. 
 We do find evidence of group optimism bias, but only for the maximization 
tournament, and only when it was the first tournament experienced.  In that 
tournament and order, t-tests indicate that the mean forecast over 72 participants was 
significantly higher than .417 in the first set forecasts (.476), as well as in the initial 
(.489) and revised (.471) second set forecasts.  While the average forecast is creeping 
in the right direction, the bias remains strong.   In contrast, when the maximization 
                                                 
14  In contrast, Grether (1992) found that financial incentives reduced the number of “absurd” 
responses. 
15  For reasons explained in footnote a of Table 2, the aggregate win rate for 3 of 8 cases was in fact 
.4153 rather than .4167. 
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tournament is experienced after verbal decoding, we find initial group pessimism bias 
for Set I only (.361), giving way to group-rational expectations for the initial and 
revised forecasts for Set II.  For the verbal decoding tournament when experienced 
first, we find initial group pessimism bias for Set I only (.361) and group-rational 
expectations thereafter.  When verbal decoding is experienced second, we find group-
rational expectations throughout.  Thus, we find group optimism bias in 3 of 12 set 
forecast cases, group pessimism bias in 2 of 12 cases, and group-rationality in 7 of 12 
cases. 
 Moving to individual level analysis, we compare the predictions and outcomes 
for each individual in both sets of both tournaments.  Here it is possible to consider 
data from both relative and absolute sessions.  The discrepancy between each 
individual’s prediction and outcome in a set, BIASi, should be zero when averaged 
across the sample in case of rational expectations, positive in case of optimistic bias, 
and negative in case of pessimistic bias.  Beginning with relative tournaments, t-tests 
find that mean BIAS is positive (optimistic) only for the maximization tournament 
when it is experienced first.   Consistent with the group bias tests, this excess 
optimism persists through to the initial and revised Set II forecasts: it is robust to 
experience and the opportunity for revision.  The order of magnitude of the bias is 
around 5%: subjects expect, on average, to win ½ a round more than they actually do 
over the 10 rounds.  When the maximization tournament is second, the mean BIAS is 
negative only for Set I and not significantly different from 0 for either forecast of Set 
II.   
In slight contrast to group bias tests, rational expectations is not rejected for 
the verbal tournament regardless of tournament order, set, or opportunity for revision.  
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Thus, of 12 possible set forecast measures, we find optimistic bias for 3, pessimistic 
bias for 1, and rational expectations for 8. 
Individual scatterplots of the four revised Set II predictions and outcomes for 
the relative tournaments are provided in Figure 1.  Points above the 45-degree line 
reflect pessimistic (or negatively biased) predictions, while points below reflect 
optimistic (or positively biased) predictions.  Rational expectations are not rejected 
for three of the four cases, and excess optimism is found for the fourth (maximization 
as a first tournament).  Note that even in the three cases of rational expectations, the 
plots show considerable dispersion in the bias numbers.  Zero bias on average appears 
to result from an even split between overly-optimistic and pessimistic subjects, rather 
than widespread individual accuracy.  Indeed the predictions of some subjects were 
off by as many as 6 (out of 10), even in the second set of the second tournament!  
When optimism persists this is because most subjects are optimistic (42% were 
optimistic, 26% unbiased, and the remaining 32% pessimistic), not simply because of 
a few outliers.  Nevertheless, in 3 of 4 cases individual biases in Set II revised 
forecasts averaged out to be insignificantly different from zero. 
 Before the advocates of rational expectations celebrate, let us move to the 
forecast bias tests in absolute contests.  The extensive literature on group optimism 
bias does not offer guidance about what to expect here.  When the maximization 
contest comes first, we find no excess optimism, but only rational expectations for Set 
I and both forecasts of Set II.  When maximization comes second (after a bruising 
verbal contest), subjects begin with optimistic bias for Set I, and overcorrect to 
pessimistic bias for the revised forecast for Set II.   That is, initial forecasts for the 
second set that would have been rational were instead revised with excessively 
pessimistic ones after disappointing results in the first set. 
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Figure 1:  Final Predictions vs. Outcomes for Set II of Relative Tournaments 
 
 Even more strikingly, subjects showed pessimistic bias in almost all cases in 
the verbal decoding contest, regardless of the order in which it appeared.  Revised Set 
II predictions reduced the bias over initial Set II predictions, but not by nearly enough 
to eliminate the bias.  In fact, the predictions were even worse after one set of 
experience was gained!  The size of this bias ranges from 12-17% depending on task 
order: on average subjects expected to win between 1.2 and 1.7 rounds less than they 
actually did over 10 rounds. 
Thus, of 12 possible set forecasts in the absolute contests, we found optimistic 
bias for 1, pessimistic bias for 6, and rational expectations for 5.   
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Figure 2:  Final Prediction vs. Outcome in Set II of Absolute Contests 
 
Individual scatterplots of revised Set II predictions and outcomes for the 
absolute contests are provided in Figure 2.  As the scatterplots show, the majority of 
subjects were overly pessimistic in the verbal tournaments (57% and 71% of subjects 
when verbal came first and second respectively), and in the maximization when it 
came second (48%).  As in the relative tournaments, individual biases were often 
quite large. 
 While subjects forecasts had greater bias in absolute contests than in relative 
tournaments, we do not find that they had greater variance.  Levene’s Test for the 
Equality of Variance in bias indicates no significant difference. 
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4.  Discussion and Conclusions  
 A robust finding from psychological studies of risk perception is that people 
tend to rate themselves below-average in their risk of experiencing unpleasant events 
and above-average in their risk of experiencing pleasant ones (Weinstein (1980)).  
These findings have been derived from hypothetical surveys, with qualitative 
prediction elicitation, no feedback, and no opportunities for learning or revision.  We 
design experiments that provide modest incentives for accurate, quantitative 
prediction, as well as opportunities for feedback, learning and forecast revision.   
 We fail to find confirmation of a robust optimism bias, either at the aggregate 
level as done in earlier studies, or at the individual level where predictions are 
compared to realized outcomes.   We find strong evidence of optimistic bias for only 
one of two tasks, in one of two orders, with one of two criteria for winning – 
maximizing an unknown function on a spreadsheet when it is the first competition 
encountered, and when the criteria for winning is relative.  We find no such optimism 
bias when maximization is experienced after another tournament, nor in verbal 
decoding tournaments in any order, nor in maximization or decoding contests in any 
order when the criteria for winning is absolute.16  
 Our results add support to the subsequent caveats in psychology that group 
optimism bias is less likely to be a problem when respondents perceive little control 
over round outcomes, or have personal experience of round outcomes, or judge the 
frequency of losing or winning to be reasonably high (Weinstein (1984), (1987)).   
 Positively, what we do find is support for rational expectations in relative 
tournaments, and some evidence of pessimistic bias in absolute contests, particularly 
verbal decoding.  Focusing on revised forecasts for Set II (where feedback and 
                                                 
16   We do find initial optimis tic bias for maximization contests when they are experienced after verbal 
contests, but it does not persist to initial or revised forecasts for Set II. 
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experience is greatest) we do not reject rational expectations for 3 of 4 cases in 
relative tournaments, with excess optimism in the final case.  In contrast, we do reject 
rational expectations in favour of excess pessimism for 3 of 4 cases in absolute 
contests, with rational expectations in the last.  What accounts for these differences? 
 First, regarding prediction in relative vs. absolute contests, we originally 
hypothesized that predicting absolute success rates would be easier than predicting 
relative ones, because the former requires knowledge of your own abilities, whereas 
the latter also requires knowledge of others’ abilities.  On reflection, however, 
predictions about meeting relative thresholds require different, rather than additional 
information.  In the decoding task, for example, subjects need only estimate whether 
their ability is in the top 5 or bottom 7 of the 12 participants in the session, and not 
whether they can accomplish specific tasks.  Useful feedback on initial relative 
standing was provided in the two hypothetical practice rounds that preceded each 
relative tournament. 
 In contrast, it might be more cognitively demanding for subjects to predict 
whether they could decode 10 or more letters in 60 seconds, and the extent to which 
they would improve at doing so over 20 rounds.  For the information provided in the 
two practice rounds preceding absolute contests would likely have revealed to 
subjects only that they were not yet near attaining the threshold. 
 Second, regarding strong pessimism in the absolute verbal contest in 
particular, we speculate that the scope for improvement there was greater than that in 
the maximization contest. Maximization did not require intense keyboard skills.  
Improvements in maximization ability were limited to insights gained over 
triangulation, efficient use of the arrow keys, and the need to pay constant attention.  
In contrast, verbal decoding required greater initial keyboard skills, and offered more 
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channels for improvement in technique.  Indeed, there was an “increasing return to 
improvement,” as letters decoded early in a round assisted in the decoding of 
subsequent letters within that round.  Our speculation is partially supported by the 
observation that average success rates changed more dramatically from first to second 
sets in decoding contests (+1.76 rounds when first, +1.85 rounds when second) than 
in maximization contests (+.85 rounds when first, +1.85 rounds when second).  With 
more room for improvement over 20 rounds came a greater potential not to recognize 
that such improvement was possible.  
 Finally, regarding the methodology of eliciting predictions in experiments, we 
find that offering modest incentives for accurate forecasts using a quadratic scoring 
rule had little positive or negative effect.  In particular, it seems possible to provide 
subjects with incentives to accurately predict their own performance without 
triggering moral hazard problems in subsequent performance.  On the other hand, the 
modest incentives of the quadratic scoring rule, weakly payoff dominant at the best of 
times, did nothing to reduce the mean or variance of forecast bias.  It is possible that 
increasing the relative payoff from prediction over performance would improve 
forecast accuracy, but it is also possible that doing so would trigger moral hazard in 
performance.  Until this is investigated, our results lend support to the practice of 
measuring expectations over outcomes that have incentives with prediction elicitation 
questions that don’t.  
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